A cell-site simulator imitates a cell tower so that nearby phones connect to it and reveal their identity and location. The Milwaukee Police Department operates several. In July I wrote that the department had no published policy for them, and I asked for the record. The department answered on October 19. It sent eight files, and none is a policy.
No policy was produced#
I requested any written policy on the device. The closest record produced is a memorandum from March 2018, written by a police officer to a captain. It describes how the device works and says: “There are only two instances where a Cell Site Simulator may be used.” The first is a warrant signed by a judge. The second is “an Exigent situation, where there is an immediate threat of great bodily harm, and/or death.”
I also requested any non-disclosure agreement with the FBI or the device’s maker. None was produced. Finally, I asked for written confirmation wherever no record exists, and the department gave none. So I cannot say that no policy or agreement exists, only that none was produced.
What the device collects#
The carrier can sometimes give a phone’s GPS position, but the standing affidavit attached to each application says “not all carriers track GPS location,” and some phones block the request. Cell tower data narrows the area only to “several square blocks to several square miles.” The simulator can locate a phone “even if it is located inside a house, apartment, or other building.”
To do that it “may briefly exchange signals with all cellular phones which are on the same provider and in its vicinity,” and the other phones end up “sending identifiers” to it. The identifiers are not phone numbers. The 2018 memo says the device is “incapable of detecting phone numbers, only unique identifiers known to the phone company.”
In the records that describe its use, the department starts with one known phone number and uses the device to find that phone. No record describes the reverse: switching the device on at a place and using the identifiers it collects to learn who was there. In these records the other phones’ identifiers are a byproduct.
The limits are in the court order#
The department produced the template it uses to ask a Milwaukee County judge for authority to track a phone. One application makes three requests: a pen register order (Wis. Stat. § 968.36), a warrant for the carrier’s records (§ 968.375(3)), and a warrant to track a communications device (§ 968.373). The judge signs three orders. One directs the carrier to hand over the phone’s identifiers and location data. One authorizes the simulator. The third seals the file.
No Wisconsin statute names the cell-site simulator. The simulator order says the device “may fall within the definition” of a pen register and is drafted to comply with that statute.
A pen register is a device that records the numbers a phone dials. The standing affidavit describes it: “A pen register will show what numbers are called by the target device.” For a pen register order, the prosecutor certifies that the information is “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”
The same application also asks for the warrant to track the phone, and that warrant requires probable cause. The simulator order rests on both. Its warrant paragraph authorizes collecting the radio signals the phone emits “in response to signals sent to the cellphone by the officers.”
The order authorizing the simulator runs sixty days, “during all times of day and night.” The statute allows extensions of sixty days each, with “no limit on the number of extensions a judge may grant.” The limits on the device are paragraphs in that order:
- The warrant “does not authorize the interception of any content.”
- The device may interrupt service to phones nearby.
- Law enforcement “will delete” information collected from phones other than the target, and make no investigative use of it without a further court order, “other than distinguishing” the target phone from the others.
- The clerk seals the application, the affidavits, and the orders. The carrier may not tell the subscriber that the order exists.
The order sets no deadline for the deletion. The statute has one destruction rule, and it covers the target: location information must be destroyed if the case ends with no one found guilty (§ 968.373(6)(b)). It says nothing about the other phones. I requested any record of how long simulator data is kept, and none was produced.
1,955 operations#
The eighth file is a log kept by the Special Investigations Division. It records 1,955 phone-tracking operations from January 2, 2020 to September 1, 2026. From 2024 on, a column titled “Track by CSS Operator” names an officer in 577 of them. I read that as the record of simulator use. The department produced no other count.
The log names the people tracked, including minors, victims, and witnesses, and the department sent it unredacted. A redacted copy and the full breakdown are in Milwaukee Police Phone Tracking Log Analysis.
The contract#
The device is bought from Tactical Support Equipment, Inc. under a city contract from August 2022, amended in August 2025 to $1,445,450 through September 30, 2028.
A June 2025 invoice bills $46,000 for the seventh year of support on an older unit, against an earlier purchase order that was not produced. Seven years puts the first purchase near 2018. The memo describes an arrest made “utilizing a Cell Site Simulator from a law enforcement partner,” and the vendor’s sole-source letter is dated three months after the memo.
What I wrote in July#
I wrote that the department “will not discuss the device” and had denied repeated records requests. This request was answered in twelve weeks, with no fee and no redaction.
I wrote that secrecy had governed the device in place of a rule. I knew the statute that requires a warrant to track a phone. I did not know the department put the simulator through it. The 2018 memo says a judge’s warrant is needed outside an emergency, and the 2024 template asks for one on probable cause.
No policy is published, and none was produced.
The warrant is required by statute. The promise to delete what the device collects from every other phone in range is a paragraph in an order that is sealed when it is signed.
Sources
The records. Produced by the Milwaukee Police Department on October 19, 2026, under Open Records Section reference 2617543. The request, the correspondence, and the seven files are posted with the records notice.
- Memorandum, “Cell Site Simulator,” P.O. Chris Heidemann to Captain Johnny Sgrignuoli, March 27, 2018
- Sole-source letter, Tactical Support Equipment, Inc., June 19, 2018
- Contract E0000019058, City of Milwaukee and Tactical Support Equipment, Inc., August 25, 2022
- Amendment 1 to Contract E0000019058, August 2025
- Standing affidavit of P.O. Christopher Randazzo, Special Investigations Division, May 31, 2024
- Tracking-warrant template, “All Carriers,” updated May 31, 2024
- Voucher GR-578839 and invoice 23-073C, June 2025
- The tracking log, a spreadsheet export of the Special Investigations Division’s “CS Tracking Log.” Not published as produced. The figures given here are counts taken from it. A redacted copy is posted with the breakdown.
The statutes: Wis. Stat. § 968.36 (pen register orders), § 968.373 (warrant to track a communications device), and § 968.375 (warrants for provider records)
The July dispatch: What Wisconsin Regulates, which carries the earlier reporting on the device
A note on method. This dispatch was assembled with AI assistance; the seven records and the statutes were read in the original, and the log’s figures were counted from the file the department produced. Any error is the author’s. It describes the record as of November 15, 2026 and is not legal advice. Corrections are welcome at contact@peopleoverprivilege.com.
